

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 DAR ES 00651 01 OF 03 261256Z

43

ACTION IO-11

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

EB-07 AID-05 COME-00 TRSE-00 EA-07 XMB-02 OPIC-03

/088 W

----- 016938

R 260900Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 809

INFO USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY MAPUTO

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMCONSUL ZANZIBAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 DAR ES SALAAM 0651

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PORG, PFOR, US, TZ

SUBJECT: MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS: RESPONSE TO QUESTIONNAIRE

REF: STATE 37591 (NOTAL)

1. IN REPLY PARA 6 REFTEL, WE FURNISH FOLLOWING RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE CONTAINED PARA 7 REFTEL CONCERNING TANZANIAN POLICIES AND PROCEDURES RELEVANT TO ITS CONDUCT IN MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL FORA. QUESTIONS FROM PARA 7 REFTEL HAVE BEEN SUMMARIZED IN REPLY.

2. A. QUESTION: WHAT ARE TANZANIA'S PRIMARY MULTILATERAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN 1976?

RESPONSE: TANZANIA HAS THREE BROAD AREAS OF INTERESTS IN GENERAL (AS OPPOSED TO PURELY REGIONAL) MULTILATERAL RELATIONS, WHICH GOVERN ITS OBJECTIVES AND POSITIONS. IN ORDER OF PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 DAR ES 00651 01 OF 03 261256Z

THEY ARE:

1. THE LIBERATION OF AFRICA FROM COLONIAL AND RACIALIST RULE. IT IS PRESIDENT NYERERE'S DEEPLY FELT BELIEF, SHARED BY MANY OF HIS COUNTRYMEN, THAT NO TANZANIAN CAN BE FREE WHILE WHITE MINORITY RULE CONTINUES IN RHODESIA, NAMIBIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA. TANZANIA IS THEREFORE PREPARED TO MAKE ITS MAJOR DIPLOMATIC EFFORT, AND TO EXPEND BOTH DIPLOMATIC AND MATERIAL RESOURCES, IN FURTHERING THE GOAL OF LIBERATION, AND ITS RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL FORA ARE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY THEIR STAND ON THESE ISSUES.

2. THE "NEW ECONOMIC ORDER". AS ONE OF THE POOREST NATIONS ON EARTH, TANZANIA IS ACUTELY AWARE OF ITS ECONOMIC WEAKNESS AND LACK OF DEVELOPMENT, AND ITS VULNERABILITY TO ECONOMIC EVENTS IN OTHER NATIONS OVER WHICH IT HAS NO CONTROL. NYERERE IS CONVINCED THAT THE ONLY LONG-RUN HOPE FOR THE PEOPLES OF THE THIRD (OR FOURTH) WORLD IS A MASSIVE TRANSFER OF RESOURCES FROM THE DEVELOPED WORLD. HE ALSO IS A PARTISAN OF A NEO-FABIANIST SCHOOL OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT WHICH TENDS TO VIEW WORLD WEALTH AS A FIXED QUANTITY, AND IS CONCERNED MORE WITH ITS DISTRIBUTION THAN WITH ITS PRODUCTION. ACCORDING TO THIS LINE OF THINKING, RESOURCES CAN BE TRANSFERRED -- IN MEANINGFUL AMOUNTS -- FROM THE DEVELOPED TO THE UNDEVELOPED WORLD ONLY IF THE FORMER IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN ITS STANDARDS OF LIVING, AND THE PROSPERITY OF ANY NATION IS SEEN AS ARISING INEVITABLY FROM ITS EXPLOITATION OF POORER ONES. TANZANIA THUS CONSIDERS THE "NEW ECONOMIC ORDER" TO BE A MATTER OF VITAL CONCERN, AND WILL PRESS FOR ALL MEASURES IT SEES AS PROMOTING A TRANSFER OF WEALTH FROM THE DEVELOPED NATIONS (INCLUDING USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE) TO THE THIRD WORLD.

3. SOLIDARITY. PERHAPS BECAUSE OF ITS VERY WEAKNESS, TANZANIA PLACES GREAT VALUE ON SOLIDARITY WITH NATIONS IT SEES, IN ONE OR ANOTHER CONTEXT, AS ITS BROTHERS, AND IS PREPARED TO MAKE CONSIDERABLE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE ISSUES WHICH THEY SEE AS IMPORTANT. TANZANIA RECOGNIZES PERHAPS THREE, OFTEN BUT NOT ALWAYS OVERLAPPING, PRINCIPLES OF SOLIDARITY: (A) SOLIDARITY AMONG THE BLACK PEOPLES OF AFRICA, AND BY GRADUALLY ATTENUATING EXTENSION, AMONG ALL PEOPLES OF AFRICA (INCLUDING NORTH AFRICANS), AMONG BLACK PEOPLES THROUGHOUT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 DAR ES 00651 01 OF 03 261256Z

THE WORLD, AND AMONG THE NON-WHITE PEOPLES GENERALLY.
(B) SOLIDARITY OF THE HAVE-NOT NATIONS AGAINST THE HAVES.
(C) SOLIDARITY OF THE "PROGRESSIVE" (I.E., SOCIALIST) NATIONS AGAINST THE CAPITALIST-IMPERIALIST COUNTRIES; THE RANGE OF "GOOD GUYS" HERE EXTENDS FROM THE COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIPS THROUGH, UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES AT LEAST, WESTERN EUROPEAN SOCIALIST AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATS. THE DIRECTION AND INTENSITY OF TANZANIAN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ON MANY ISSUES DEPENDS ON THE

DEGREE OF SOLIDARITY TANZANIA FEELS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THESE CRITERIA, WITH THOSE NATIONS RAISING THEM.

IT IS NOTICEABLE THAT THESE DIPLOMATIC INTERESTS DO NOT CUT VERY CLOSE (EXCEPT IN THE ECONOMIC DOMAIN) TO TANZANIA'S VITAL INTERESTS AS A NATION. TANZANIA REGULARLY GOES TO BAT ON ISSUES WHICH DO NOT SEEM TO CONCERN IT; WEAK AS IT IS, IT IS PREPARED TO TELL OTHER NATIONS HOW THEY OUGHT TO CONDUCT THEIR AFFAIRS. THIS IS A MORALISTIC STANCE MADE POSSIBLE, NO DOUBT, BY THE FACT THAT TANZANIA'S PHYSICAL SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, ITS DOMESTIC TRANQUILLITY, AND ITS NATIONAL DIGNITY, ARE RARELY THREATENED BY DEBATES IN MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS (WE ARE NOT CONSIDERING HERE REGIONAL RELATIONS WITHIN THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY).

TANZANIA ENJOYS WIDESPREAD RESPECT, FOR VARYING REASONS, FROM THE COMMUNIST STATES, THE THIRD WORLD, AND WESTERN LIBERALS, WHICH ENABLES IT TO PLAY A DIPLOMATIC ROLE GREATER THAN ITS POWER OR WEALTH WOULD OTHERWISE PERMIT. IT HAS ALSO PRODUCED A NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE DIPLOMATS AND POWERFUL ORATORS CAPABLE OF MAKING THEIR OWN PERSONALITIES FELT. FOR THIS REASON TANZANIA DOES WELL IN OBTAINING GOOD POSITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BODIES. AT PRESENT TANZANIA IS A MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ITS PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN, SALIM SALIM, IS THE PERENNIAL CHAIRMAN OF THE DECOLONIZATION COMMITTEE (COMMITTEE OF 24), WHICH IS INVOLVED IN THE ISSUES CLOSEST TO TANZANIA'S HEART. AS PERMANENT HOST TO THE OAU LIBERATION COMMITTEE, TANZANIA ENJOYS A SPECIAL POSITION IN THE OAU, AND IT IS A MEMBER OF THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP. WE KNOW OF NO OTHER MAJOR INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS TO WHICH TANZANIA IS PRESENTLY AN ACTIVE ASPIRANT.

TANZANIA IS IN OPPOSITION TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE GREAT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 DAR ES 00651 01 OF 03 261256Z

MAJORITY OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH COME BEFORE MULTILATERAL BODIES ON WHICH BOTH ARE REPRESENTED. THE DEGREE TO WHICH TANZANIA TAKS AN ACTIVE ROLE IS LARGELY DETERMINED BY THE THREE PRIMARY NATIONAL INTERESTS DISCUSSED ABOVE. AMONG THE NATIONS WHICH MOST QUALIFY FOR TANZANIAN SOLIDARITY, BECAUSE THEY ARE SEEN AT ONCE AS "PROGRESSIVE", UNDER-DEVELOPED, AND NON-WHITE, ARE CUBA, THE COMMUNIST STATES OF INDOCHINA, AND NORTH KOREA, ALL OF WHICH REGULARLY PRESS CAUSES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES, AND RECEIVE STRONG TANZANIAN BACKING IN SO DOING.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 DAR ES 00651 02 OF 03 261315Z

43

ACTION IO-11

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

EB-07 AID-05 COME-00 TRSE-00 EA-07 XMB-02 OPIC-03

/088 W

----- 017365

R 260900Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 810

INFO USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY MAPUTO

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMCONSUL ZANZIBAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 DAR ES SALAAM 0651

B. QUESTION: TO WHAT EXTENT DO OTHER COUNTRIES AND GROUPS OF COUNTRIES AFFECT TANZANIA'S MULTILATERAL POLICY MAKING? DOES TANZANIA HAVE OR TRY TO EXERT INFLUENCE ON OTHER COUNTRIES?

RESPONSE: TANZANIA PRIDES ITSELF ON ITS INDEPENDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, AND ON ITS REJECTION OF ANY EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE ITS STANCE OR ITS VOTE. TANZANIA'S RELATIVE INDEPENDENCE FROM ANY SINGLE FOREIGN "PATRON", ITS GOOD STANDING WITH THE MAJORITY OF NATIONS, THE FASHIONABLENESS OF ITS POSITIONS IN MOST BROAD-BASED INTERNATIONAL FORA TODAY, AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF MOST INTERNATIONAL ISSUES (OUTSIDE THE ECONOMIC SPHERE) TO VITAL TANZANIAN ISSUES, MEAN THAT TANZANIA VERY RARELY FEELS UNDER PRESSURE TO SUPPORT POSITIONS IT DOES NOT REALLY ENDORSE.

IN AFRICA ITSELF, THIS IS NOT SO MUCH THE CASE, AND IN AFRICA, ALSO, THERE ARE AT LEAST A FEW COUNTRIES ABLE TO EXERT REAL INFLUENCE ON TANZANIA. FOREMOST AMONG THEM ARE MOZAMBIQUE AND ZAMBIA, THE FORMER BECAUSE OF THE IDEOLOGICAL BOND FORMED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 DAR ES 00651 02 OF 03 261315Z

DURING FRELIMO'S LONG STRUGGLE AGAINST PORTUGAL, USING TANZANIA AS ITS BASE, AND THE LATTER BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENTS NYERERE AND KAUNDA. TANZANIA IS LIKELY TO FEEL UNDER SOME DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE TO THE POLICIES OF THESE TWO NATIONS EVEN WHEN IT DOES NOT AGREE WITH THEM; WITH MOZAMBIQUE THIS ACCOMMODATION IS LIKELY TO BE IN A "RADICAL" DIRECTION, WITH ZAMBIA IN A "MODERATE" ONE. BEFORE THE FALL OF PRESIDENT OBOTE, UGANDA ENJOYED A SIMILAR RELATIONSHIP. KENYA, THE COUNTRY WITH WHICH TANZANIA HAS THE CLOSEST ECONOMIC, PHYSICAL, AND PERCEPTUAL TIES, UNDOUBTEDLY CAN EXERT INFLUENCE -- PRIMARILY IN ECONOMIC OR TECHNICAL FIELDS -- DESPITE THE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES; ON BROAD POLITICAL ISSUES, HOWEVER, KENYA HAS LITTLE INFLUENCE.

THE DEGREE TO WHICH COMMUNIST CHINA CAN EXERT INFLUENCE OVER TANZANIA IS A QUESTION WHICH IS OFTEN POSED. IT IS A QUESTION WHICH IS HARD TO PUT TO THE TEST, BECAUSE TANZANIA'S AND CHINA'S VIEWS ARE CONGRUENT ON MOST ISSUES. NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE THE HEAVY CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN THE TANZANIAN ECONOMY AS A RESULT OF THE TAN-ZAM RAILWAY, AND CHINESE PREDOMINANCE IN TRAINING AND EQUIPPING TANZANIAN TROOPS, TANZANIA HAS BEEN ABLE TO, AND HAS, TAKEN STRONG POSITIONS OPPOSED TO THOSE OF CHINA -- AS IN ITS SUPPORT FOR THE MPLA IN ANGOLA. OF THE OTHER MAJOR POWERS, BRITAIN PROBABLY HAS SOME RESIDUAL INFLUENCE -- LARGELY IN TECHNICAL AREAS -- BASED ON TANZANIA'S COLONIAL HISTORY AND COMMONWEALTH MEMBERSHIP.

TANZANIA'S POSITION ON ISSUES PERIPHERAL TO IT IS INFLUENCED BY THE DEGREE OF SOLIDARITY TANZANIA FEELS WITH THE VARIOUS SIDES IN THOSE ISSUES, AS HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED. TO THE EXTENT THAT A COUNTRY IS -- OR ESPOUSES CAUSES LINKED TO -- THE STRUGGLE OF NON-WHITES AGAINST WHITES, OF THE POOR NATIONS AGAINST THE RICH, AND OF THE "SOCIALIST" NATIONS AGAINST THE "IMPERIALISTS", IT IS LIKELY TO BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE TANZANIA'S INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR. LESS IMPORTANT FACTORS ARE TANZANIA'S PREFERENCES FOR CIVILIAN AS OPPOSED TO MILITARY REGIMES, AND FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO BLOODSHED.

FINALLY, AND CONVERSELY, TANZANIA IS NOT INFREQUENTLY INFLUENCED NEGATIVELY IN INTERNATIONAL ARENAS. ANY POSITION TAKEN BY SOUTH AFRICA, FOR EXAMPLE, IS LIKELY TO BE CONSIDERED CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 DAR ES 00651 02 OF 03 261315Z

AUTOMATICALLY AS ANATHEMA BY TANZANIA. A FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL HAS TOLD US THAT TANZANIA ALSO TENDS TO VOTE AUTOMATICALLY AGAINST ANY POSITION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES (AS THE LEADER OF THE CAPITALIST, WHITE, RICH WORLD) UNLESS REASONS FOR DOING OTHERWISE ARE MADE CLEAR TO IT; TANZANIA IS, HOWEVER, USUALLY WILLING TO LISTEN TO US AS IT

WOULD NOT LISTEN TO SOUTH AFRICA.

C. QUESTION: DOES TANZANIA FULLY INSTRUCT ITS DELEGATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS? DOES IT CONTROL THEM AFTERWARDS? ARE COMMUNICATIONS ADEQUATE?

RESPONSE: TANZANIA HAS A FOREIGN MINISTRY WHICH, GIVEN ITS INVOLVEMENT IN A HOST OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, IS SMALL AND OVERBURDENED. MOST OF ITS OFFICERS ARE RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED; ITS FILES AND INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS ARE INEFFICIENT; IT HAS VIRTUALLY NO REFERENCE OR BACKUP MATERIAL; AND BECAUSE OF TANZANIA'S RELATIVELY RECENT ACCESSION TO INDEPENDENCE, IT HAS NEITHER INSTITUTIONAL NOR INDIVIDUAL MEMORIES OF MAJOR HISTORIC EVENTS OF EVEN THE RECENT PAST, SUCH AS THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLD WAR, OR THE KOREAN WAR.

THE MINISTRY TRIES TO INSTRUCT ITS DELEGATIONS AS WELL AS IT CAN, BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE TANZANIA ATTACHES TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL, AND ECONOMIC ISSUES. BUT IT IS ILL EQUIPPED TO DO SO EXCEPT IN MATTERS OF IDEOLOGICAL STANCE. TANZANIAN DELEGATIONS MUST, THEN, OPERATE A GOOD DEAL FROM GENERAL PRINCIPLES -- GIVEN TANZANIAN POLICIES THIS IS RARELY DIFFICULT -- AND TO IMPROVISE ON TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL QUESTIONS. SALIM SALIM, TANZANIA'S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, APPEARS TO ENJOY THE CONFIDENCE OF HIS GOVERNMENT, AND WHILE HE AND OTHER TANZANIAN DIPLOMATS EXCEED OR MISINTERPRET INSTRUCTIONS ON OCCASION, THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN FREQUENTLY.

A TECHNICAL COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEM ALSO EXISTS. TANZANIA HAS NEITHER THE STAFF NOR THE FACILITIES TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE, RAPID COMMUNICATIONS WITH ITS DELEGATIONS IN THE FIELD. SALIM SALIM EVIDENTLY DOES NOT CLEAR HIS SPEECHES OR PUBLIC STATEMENTS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, OR EVEN WIRE HOME THEIR TEXTS, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 DAR ES 00651 02 OF 03 261315Z

SO THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS LARGELY DEPENDENT ON BRIEF WIRE SERVICE NEWS REPORTS AS TO WHAT HE IS UP TO. ON OCCASIONS WHEN WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SHOW FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS VERBATIM TEXTS OF SALIM'S SPEECHES, THEY HAVE SOMETIMES INDICATED THEIR DISPLEASURE WITH HIS REMARKS. (N.B. IT WOULDN'T THEREFORE BE USEFUL IF USUN, USMISSION GENEVA, ET AL., COULD FURNISH US PROMPTLY WITH FULL TEXTS OF MAJOR TANZANIAN STATEMENTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH APPEAR TO OFFER GROUNDS FOR MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY; WE CAN'T DISCUSS THEM MEANINGFULLY UNLESS WE PROVIDE THE TEXTS*)

GIVEN THESE CONSIDERATIONS, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS MOST USEFUL TO MAKE DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES TO THE TANZANIAN FOREIGN

MINISTRY WELL BEFORE A DELEGATION LEAVES DAR ES SALAAM, IN THE HOPE OF GETTING IT INSTRUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR WISHES. (THE COMPOSITION OF DELEGATIONS, AND THEIR SCHEDULES, ARE ALL TOO OFTEN IMPROVISED AT THE LAST MINUTE.) CERTAINLY, APPROACHES TO THE DELEGATION ON THE SCENE OF AN INTERNATIONAL MEETING CAN ALSO BE USEFUL, BUT ARE UNLIKELY TO AFFECT ANY INSTRUCTIONS THE DELEGATION HAS BROUGHT WITH IT; THE DELEGATION WILL PROBABLY NOT SEND FOR NEW INSTRUCTIONS ON THE BASIS OF OUR DEMARCHES.

IN MAKING DEMARCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, HOWEVER, THE GROUND MUST BE CAREFULLY PREPARED, AND COMPLETE BACKGROUND INFORMATION FURNISHED -- OFTEN IN DUPLICATE-- WELL BEFORE THE MINISTRY MUST FOCUS ON MAKING A DECISION. IDEAS ONCE PLANTED MUST BE REITERATED REGULARLY, OR THEY WILL BE FORGOTTEN. TANZANIA HAS FIRM AND DETAILED POLICIES ON GUAM, FOR REASONS OF SOLIDARITY DISCUSSED ABOVE, BUT IT HAS ONLY THE DIMMEST NOTIONS OF WHAT OR WHERE GUAM IS, AND NOWHERE BUT US TO FIND OUT.

FINALLY, SIGNIFICANT MODIFICATIONS OF POLICY ARE MADE ONLY BY PRESIDENT NYERERE. IF HE IS TO RESPOND MEANINGFULLY TO OUR APPROACHES, HE AND HIS AIDES WILL ALSO NEED TO HAVE OBTAINED, THROUGH THEIR OWN CHANNELS, THE NECESSARY BACKGROUND INFORMATION. OUR PREPARATION IN GETTING FACTS AND BACKGROUND INTO THE PROPER HANDS, AND MAKING SURE THEY ARE NOT LOST OR FORGOTTEN, MUST BE DONE CAREFULLY OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 DAR ES 00651 03 OF 03 261318Z

43

ACTION IO-11

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

EB-07 AID-05 COME-00 TRSE-00 EA-07 XMB-02 OPIC-03

/088 W

----- 017386

R 260900Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 811

INFO USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMCONSUL ZANZIBAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 DAR ES SALAAM 0651

D. QUESTION: DO TANZANIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS HAVE ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL INDEPENDENT POLITICAL POWER WHICH MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL OR INSTRUCT THEM?

RESPONSE: TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, AND IN COMPARISON WITH MANY OTHER NATIONS, NO. WHILE THE TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT SOMETIMES MAKES APPOINTMENTS FOR POLITICAL REASONS, IT RARELY IF EVER DOES SO BECAUSE IT IS AFRAID OF THE MEN WHO ARE BEING SENT ABROAD. TANZANIA'S INTERNAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE IS NOT SUCH, AT THE PRESENT TIME, TO MAKE PROBABLE A SITUATION IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE ANY REAL DIFFICULTY IN CONTROLLING ITS REPRESENTATIVES.

THIS SAID, IT IS ALSO OF COURSE TRUE THAT TANZANIA'S RESOURCES IN SKILLED DIPLOMATS ARE LIMITED. A CAPABLE MAN -- SUCH AS SALIM SALIM, FOR EXAMPLE -- CAN EXERT A CERTAIN AUTONOMY BY VIRTUE OF THE FACTS THAT HE WOULD BE HARD TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 DAR ES 00651 03 OF 03 261318Z

REPLACE AND THAT THERE ARE FEW WITH THE ABILITY TO CONTROL HIM. BUT EVEN HE COULD NOT GET SERIOUSLY OUT OF LINE WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING HIS CAREER.

E. QUESTION: IS TANZANIA NORMALLY RECEPTIVE TO US REPRESENTATIONS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES? DOES IT ACCEPT US-TANZANIAN INTERACTION ON THESE ISSUES AS A PART OF BILATERAL RELATIONS? DOES IT SOLICIT USG SUPPORT THROUGH THE EMBASSY ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES?

RESPONSE: TANZANIA IS USUALLY WILLING TO LISTEN POLITELY TO US REPRESENTATIONS, BUT IS RARELY RECEPTIVE EXCEPT IN TECHNICAL MATTERS REMOVED FROM THE MAINSTREAM OF PERCEIVED NATIONAL INTERESTS. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT REPRESENTATIONS ON MORE SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS, EVEN IF THEY RARELY SHOW RAPID POSITIVE RESULTS, SERVE A USEFUL FUNCTION IN OPENING THE EYES OF RESPONSIBLE TANZANIAN OFFICIALS TO ASPECTS OF WORLD ISSUES WHICH OTHERWISE ESCAPE THEM. EVEN IF TANZANIA DOES NOT CHANGE ITS STANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES, SUCH EDUCATIVE EFFORTS MAY AFFECT ITS APPROACH TO ISSUES ARISING IN THE FUTURE.

IN MAKING REPRESENTATIONS, HOWEVER, IT IS NECESSARY ALWAYS TO REMAIN AWARE THAT TANZANIAN AS A WEAK BUT PROUD NATION, IS HYPERSENSITIVE TO THE IDEA THAT IT IS BEING "BULLIED"

BY OTHER COUNTRIES AND ESPECIALLY THE BIG POWERS. EVEN ORDINARY USG DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE MAY SOMETIMES BE SO INTERPRETED. THIS KIND OF REACTION VIRTUALLY SHUTS OFF COMMUNICATION, AND FORECLOSES THE IMMEDIATE ISSUE AT HAND. WE BELIEVE THE EMBASSY, IN MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO THE TANZANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY SHOULD AS A MATTER OF COURSE BE GIVEN FAIRLY WIDE LATITUDE IN CHOOSING THE LANGUAGE MOST LIKELY TO BE UNDERSTOOD HERE AS ACCURATELY CONVEYING THE DEPARTMENT'S INTENT.

EFFORTS TO LINK MULTILATERAL, INTERNATIONAL ISSUES WITH OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS ARE EQUALLY LIKELY TO CAUSE TANZANIAN RESENTMENT. IN PARTICULAR, THE SUGGESTION, EVEN TACIT, THAT OUR BILATERAL ECONOMIC AID COULD BE AFFECTED BY THE WAY TANZANIA VOTES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, IS INTERPRETED AS WHOLLY IMPROPER "BLACKMAIL" WHICH TANZANIA, AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, IS BOUND TO REJECT. TANZANIA HAS REPEATEDLY ASSERTED, AND ON OCCASION DEMONSTRATED, THAT IT IS WILLING TO FOREGO AID RATHER

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 DAR ES 00651 03 OF 03 261318Z

THAN APPEAR TO GIVE IN TO PRESSURE, OR EVEN BE ASSOCIATED WITH AN INTERNATIONAL POLICY IT DISLIKES.

TO THE EXTENT THAT TANZANIA DOES MODIFY ITS STANCE ON AN ISSUE IMPORTANT TO IT, IT WILL INSIST THAT THE CHANGE APPEAR TO BE MADE SOLELY ON THE MERITS, AND WILL NOT ADMIT, EVEN PRIVATELY, THAT BIG POWER PRESSURES HAVE PLAYED A ROLE IN IT.

ON SOME ISSUES, ESPECIALLY TECHNICAL ONES OUTSIDE ITS SPHERE OF KNOWLEDGE AND SPECIAL INTERESTS, TANZANIA MAY BE RECEPTIVE TO US REPRESENTATIONS, AND EVEN WELCOME THEM, SINCE, DESPITE OUR IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES, TANZANIA HAS A GENUINE RESPECT FOR AMERICAN EXPERTISE AND TECHNICAL ABILITY. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, TANZANIA IS INTERESTED IN US VIEWS ON SOME LAW OF THE SEA MATTERS, AND HAS REQUESTED BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND ADVANCE BRIEFING ON WHAT US POSITIONS WILL BE. WHILE TALKING TO TANZANIANS ON SUCH TECHNICAL MATTERS CAN IN MANY CASES BEST BE DONE ON THE SCENE OF INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS, AS TANZANIAN DELEGATIONS MAY BE ON THEIR OWN, REPRESENTATIONS THROUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY CAN ALSO BE USEFUL. THIS IS AN AVENUE THE US MIGHT MAKE GREATER USE OF, SO LONG AS ITS VERY REAL LIMITATIONS ARE FULLY RECOGNIZED.

TANZANIA IS MORE LIKELY TO SOLICIT US SUPPORT FOR ITS INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS THROUGH PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND EXHORTATIONS, THAN THROUGH PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC DEMARCHES, ESPECIALLY IN AREAS OF MAJOR POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC CONCERN. IN THESE AREAS, TANZANIA HAS LITTLE EXPECTATION OF OBTAINING OUR SUPPORT, AND WILL CALL FOR IT PRINCIPALLY FOR EFFECT. IT HAS RARELY USED THIS EMBASSY AS A CHANNEL FOR SOLICITING AMERICAN SUPPORT, EVEN ON

ISSUES IN WHICH IT MIGHT REALISTICALLY HAVE A CHANCE OF WINNING
IT.
SPAIN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, QUESTIONNAIRE, DEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATION, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 26 FEB 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: greeneet
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976DARES00651
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760072-0696
From: DAR ES SALAAM
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760211/aaaaajac.tel
Line Count: 496
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION IO
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 76 STATE 37591
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: greeneet
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 11 MAY 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <11 MAY 2004 by ifshinsr>; APPROVED <13 SEP 2004 by greeneet>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS: RESPONSE TO QUESTIONNAIRE
TAGS: PORG, PFOR, US, TZ, XX
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006